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Abstract. Modeling privacy for RFID protocols went through different milestones. One pretty complete
model was proposed by Vaudenay at ASIACRYPT 2007. It provides a hierarchy of privacy levels, depending
on whether corruption is addressed by the protocol and on whether the return channel from the reader is
available. The strongest notion of privacy was proven to be impossible to achieve, but the counterexample
which was given was not convincing. Somehow, it showed that the requirements for strong privacy were
unnecessarily too high. Several amendments were considered until a slight change in the definition which
was proposed at CANS 2012. There, the simulator (blinder) was given access to the adversary’s random
tape, making him able to read his mind. Thanks to plaintext-aware encryption, we can now prove that strong
privacy is possible.
1 RFID Protocols and Privacy Issues
RFID protocols must face to contradictory requirements. On the one hand, RFID tags should be able
to securely authenticate to a reader (or a network of readers). On the other hand, nobody else should
be able to identify or trace tags as they move and interact with the environment. Since communication
is wireless, modeling these requirements, then providing provably secure protocols, are challenging
tasks for cryptographers.
We assume that tags are simple devices which can only respond to requests and do simple oper-
ations and data storage. They interact with readers. Readers are connected to a central server which
maintains a database. Typically, we focus on the tag-reader protocol and assume that the reader net-
work system is perfectly secure.
Ideally, an RFID protocol would be a two-path protocol in which the reader sends a challenge,
then the tag answers. The tag may remain stateless. Otherwise, writing in memory would induce an
overhead.
Clearly, if the response function is deterministic, one can easily trace a tag by replaying a chal-
lenge: the answer to the same challenge by the same tag will always be the same. So, the response
function must be randomized.
Now, if the adversary can corrupt all tags and read their memory at the end of the attack, it may be
the case that what leaks enables to identify which tag answered, when we use symmetric cryptography.
To avoid that, [5] considered stateful protocols in which the key which was used to respond is updated
in a one-way manner. This is the notion of forward privacy.
In [1], the authors consider that corruption may occur at earlier stages. I.e., not only at the end of
the attack.
Finally, [3] notices that an adversary could try do desynchronize a stateful tag from its database so
that it will no longer be identified. Then, if the adversary gets whether readers identify tags through a
return channel (e.g., by looking at whether a door opens or not, if the reader is used for access control
to buildings), then the protocol by [5] offers no longer privacy.
2 The 2007 Privacy Model(s)
We review here the formalism from [7].
Adversaries are assumed to have full control on the communication with tags and readers. They
can activate the reader to start a protocol. They can draw anonymous tags with a chosen distribution.
They can communicate with drawn tags. They can initiate the creation of tags which belong to the
system or not. They can free drawn tags so that they may be drawn again. They may corrupt drawn
tags to retrieve their memory. They may read the return channel from the reader to see whether the
protocol succeeded.
We distinguish 2 3 classes of adversaries. On one dimension, we distinguish whether they use
the return channel or not. Adversaries not using it are called narrow adversaries. Others are wide
adversaries. On the other dimension, we distinguish the type of corruption. Adversaries using no
corruption are called weak. Adversaries making all corruptions at the end of their attack are called
forward. Others are called strong.
The (strongest) security notion implies that for any wide-strong adversary, the probability that
there is a reader protocol which succeeds to identify a tag but that tag has no matching conversation
is negligible.
In the privacy game, we consider an adversary running the attack, then getting the table of ID’s of
all drawn tags, then producing a bit. Privacy implies that the bit they produce would be the same if all
communication and return channels were simulated. Concretely, privacy holds if for all adversaries,
there exists a simulator (called a blinder) who sees the interaction between the adversary and the
system but simulates all messages from tags, the reader, and the return channel; which blinder would
be such that the blinded experiment produces indistinguishable outcomes form the un-blinded one.
We can achieve security and wide-weak privacy with a simple protocol based on a PRF. Protocols
like [5] may achieve security and narrow-forward privacy in the random oracle model. Finally, we can
achieve security, narrow-strong privacy, and wide-forward privacy at the same time using a public-key
cryptosystem which is IND-CCA secure.
This protocol, called the PKC protocol, works as follows. A public/secret key pair is generated.
The reader receives the secret key KS while the public one KP is stored in all tags. Each tag receives
an ID and a secret K which is also stored in the database. To authenticate, the tag receives a random
challenge a and encrypts, with KP, the ID, K, and a together. The ciphertext is the response. The reader
can decrypt it with KS, check that the challenge is correct, then check the entry in the database.
Tag System
state: KP; ID;K secret key: KS
f: : : ;(ID;K); : : :g
a               pick a
c= EncKP(IDkKka) c             ! DecKS(c) = IDkKka
check a, (ID;K)
output: ID
It was shown that security and wide-strong privacy were impossible to achieve at the same time.
To prove that, we first consider a wide-strong adversary who creates a legitimate tag, then corrupt
it. Then, he simulates the creation of an illegitimate tag. He flips a coin and, based on the outcome,
decides to simulate one tag or the other to the reader. Then, the result channel gives a bit and the
adversary compares it with the coin flip to produce the result.
If the protocol was wide-strong private, there would be a blinder to simulate the reader and yield
whether or not the simulated tag was the legitimate one or not. This blinder would work based on
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the state of the legitimate tag (obtained from corruption). Then, this blinder could be used by a new
adversary.
The new adversary creates two legitimate tags, corrupt them both, then draw one or the other at
random, and interact with the drawn tag. Simulating the previous blinder would make it possible to
identify the tag. Then, the adversary would check from the table of ID’s if this was correct. Clearly,
this new adversary cannot be blinded.
One crucial point in this proof is that the first adversary is querying the result channel for a bit that
he already knows but that a blinder has troubles to simulate. This was observed by [4] who suggested
that adversary should not ask questions to the environment for which they know the answer. This is
the notion of wise adversary. However, it is pretty complicated to formalize it.
3 The 2012 Amendment
An alternate amendment was proposed in [6]. There, the definition of the blinder was updated so that
the blinder would have access to the adversary’s random tape. Thus, the blinder could compute the
same information that the adversary knows, and he would therefore be able to simulate the answers
from the environment that the adversary knows. Somehow, the blinder would read the adversary’s
mind.
With this new formalism, we can prove that the above PKC protocol provides wide-strong privacy
(in the updated formalism), when the cryptosystem is IND-CPA secure and PA2-secure. PA2-security
stands for plaintext awareness. The idea is that by reading the adversary’s random tape and the cipher-
texts that they produce, a blinder could deduce which plaintext was encrypted by the adversary.
We could further show that some IND-CCA-secure cryptosystems which are not PA2-secure do
not make the PKC protocol wide-strong private.
4 Conclusion
In [2], another privacy model was presented. This model is much simpler as it is not based on simula-
tion. However, it was shown that IND-CCA-secure cryptosystems make the PKC protocol wide-strong
private in this model. This suggests that there is a gap between the two models. So far, no separating
protocol has shown to leak any private information in a real-life setting. Providing such a protocol is
an open problem.
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